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Abstract
In this paper I show how the existence of short-term trading causes a diver-
gence between the average price and the average expectation of the fundamen-
tal value by embedding higher-order expectations –expectations of expectations
of expectations...– into prices. Short-term trading arises when investors receive
private information and (i) either net supply mean reverts or (ii) the release of
additional information related to existing information is combined with residual
uncertainty. Mean-reversion of net supply, brings the average expectation closer to
the fundamental value than the average price after the release of private informa-
tion. By the contrary, residual uncertainty and an incoming release of information
brings the average price closer to the fundamental value than the average expec-
tation before the new information is released. When both (i) and (ii) are present,
the average expectation tends to be closer to the fundamental value than the av-
erage price in the periods immediately after information releases, but the opposite
happens in the periods immediately before information releases.
∗ISCTE Business School, Av. Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisbon, Portugal. Phone: +351 21 790 39
16. E-mail: antonio.barbosa@iscte.pt
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1 Introduction
In a static setting, the equilibrium price of a risky asset equals the average expecta-
tion of market participants about its terminal payoff, adjusted for a risk premium. If
the asset is, on average, in zero net supply, there is no risk premium and the average
price coincides with the average expectation. However, this is not necessarily true in
a dynamic setting. If investors engage in short-term trading, they care about inter-
mediate prices, which embeds higher-order expectations – expectations of expectations
of expectations...– into prices.1 This creates a wedge between the average price and
the average first-order expectation of the liquidation value because the law of iterated
expectations fails for average expectations (Allen et al., 2006).
Allen et al. (2006) show that, in a dynamic economy populated by short-term in-
vestors, with no residual uncertainty and i.i.d. noise trade, short-term trading leads
to over-reliance on public information when investors have private information.2 This
means that the average expectation of the liquidation value are closer to the fundamen-
tal value than the average price. In their own words,
“Now suppose that the individual is asked to guess what the average ex-
pectation of the asset’s payoff is. Since he knows that others have also
observed the same public signal, the public signal is a better predictor of
average opinion; he will put more weight on the public signal than on the
private signal. Thus if individuals’ willingness to pay for an asset is related
to their expectations of the average opinion, then we will tend to have asset
prices overweighting public information relative to the private information.”
and go as far as saying that (my emphasis)
“Thus any model where higher-order beliefs play a role in pricing assets will
deliver the conclusion that there is an excess reliance on public information.”
Cespa and Vives (2012) show that, contrary to Allen et al.’s bold claim, over-reliance
on public information is not an universal result when higher-order beliefs are embedded
in prices. This is true even for an economy populated by short-run investors as in
Allen et al., 2006 if noise trade is not i.i.d.. In an economy populated by long-run
1Higher-order expectation are imbedded into prices because the price at the second to last trading
date depends on the average expectation of the price at the last trading date, which in turn depends
on the average expectation of the terminal payoff, and so on. Thus, prices exhibit beauty contest
features, as envisioned by Keynes (1936).
2There is residual uncertainty when the market as a whole does not have enough information to
reveal the terminal payoff.
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investors, Cespa and Vives (2012) claim that whether over-reliance or under-reliance
on public information obtains, depends on the parameters of the model. Specifically,
over-reliance on public information is obtained when residual uncertainty is low, and net
supply changes are strongly correlated. Otherwise, under-reliance on public information
is obtained.
My contribute to this recent literature is to identify the crucial role of the infor-
mation environment on over- and under-reliance on public information when investors
have long-run investment horizons. Cespa and Vives (2012) fail to identify the role of
the information environment for two reasons: first, they always assume that investors
observe private exogenous information at all periods; second, they consider only two
trading dates.3 By relaxing the first assumption, I show that under-reliance on public
information occurs only if additional exogenous information related to existing private
information is known to be released in the future. By expanding the model to allow
more than two trading dates, I show that over- and under-reliance on public information
can arise in the same economy at different dates: over-reliance on public information
is most likely to occur in the periods immediately after the release of exogenous in-
formation; in turn, under-reliance on public information tends to occur in the periods
immediately preceding the release of additional exogenous information.
The intuition is the following. On average, investors believe that the price reaction
to the initial release of private exogenous information is due not only to a change in
informed demand, but also to a change in the liquidity driven demand away from zero.
If noise trading is persistent, future price changes are unpredictable, and there is no
short-term trading. In this case the average price and expectation coincide. But if noise
trading mean reverts, investors can forecast future net supply levels and prices. This
creates a short-term opportunity to profit from liquidity traders as they exit the market,
and makes investors less eager to build their long-run position immediately. That is,
short-term trading diverts attentions from the long-run. As a result, less of the private
information makes its way into prices, which causes the average price to be further
away from the fundamental value than the average expectation of the liquidation value.
That is, prices over-rely on public information.
In turn, when investors expect the release of additional exogenous information re-
lated to their private information, they use their private information more aggressively
to bet on the price impact of the incoming information. This impounds more of the
existing information into prices, bringing the average price closer to the fundamental
3Endogenous information is that obtained from the observation of prices. Exogenous information
is information obtained from any other source.
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value than the average expectation. In other words, prices under-rely on public infor-
mation. Using Allen et al.’s intuition, on the one hand, all investors observed the same
public information (the common prior), and a private signal. Although investors know
what the public information was, they can only make an inaccurate estimate of what
other investors’ private signals might have been. Hence the tendency to over-rely on
public information. But, on the other hand, all investors will observe another private
signal related to the private signal already observed. Since the incoming private signal
can be forecasted with the previously observed private signal, investors will rely more
heavily on their own private signal and less on the public signal when forming beliefs
about others’ beliefs. Allen et al. (2006) do not obtain this result because in their model
(i) there is no residual uncertainty and (ii) there is mean-reversion of net supply.
When net supply mean reverts and there is an additional release of information,
the effect of the former tends to dominate in the periods closer to the initial relase of
private information, because this is when the net supply level is believed to be further
away from its unconditional mean; whereas the effect of the latter tends to dominate
in the periods closer to the relase of the new information, for that is when expected
price impact of the new information is believed to be strongest. This means that prices
tend to over-rely on public information in the periods following information releases
and under-rely on public information in the periods leading to information releases.
In addition, I show that over-reliance on public information is one-to-one with the
average expectation being closer to the fundamental value than the average price only
when all exogenous information is based on the same underlying signal. When that
is not the case, it is possible for the average price to be the best predictor of the
fundamental value even though prices over-rely on public information.
Finally, I point out that the price pattern preceding the release of additional ex-
ogenous information resembles the leakage of inside information, and that prices tend
to be more informative about the fundamental value in periods of high price volatility.
The latter backs the traditional view of a more volatility market as one where more
information is gathered (e.g. Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988) and it is in contrast with
the results of Cespa (2002).
This paper is closely related to Barbosa (2011) in that they share the same model.
However, the set of questions analyzed are clearly distinct. In Barbosa (2011) I study the
time-series of average prices and expectations following the release of private exogenous
information. Here, I study how the average price compares to the average expectation
at any given point in time.
This paper is organized as follows. I describe the model in Section 2 and solve
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for the equilibrium price and demand functions in Section 3. In Section 4 I study
how the average price diverges from the average expectation of the liquidation value
and from the fundamental value when there is a single signal underlying all releases of
exogenous information. In Section 5 I analyze how different underlying signals change
those results. In Section 6 I discuss additional implications of the model, and Section
7 concludes. All proofs and additional discussion are provided in the Appendix.
2 The Model
I will use the same model developed in Barbosa (2011). For convenience, I will describe
it here once again. There is one risky asset and one riskless asset traded at dates
1, 2, ..., T − 1. The riskless asset has a perfectly elastic supply and a zero net rate of
return. The risky asset is liquidated at date T , paying v ∼ N (0, σ2v). The date t risky
asset’s per capita net supply (θt) is random, due to noise/liquidity driven demand, and
follows the AR (1) process
θt = ρθt−1 + εθ,t, εθ,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2θ
)
, t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1 (1)
with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and θ0 = 0.
There is a continuum of risk averse investors of measure 1, indexed by i. All investors
have CARA preferences over their terminal wealth (W iT ) with the same coefficient of
risk aversion (α). At every date t, investor i chooses the risky asset demand (X it) that
maximizes his expected utility conditional on the information currently available to him
(F it ) by solving
max
Xit
E
[
−e−αW
i
T |F it
]
s.t. W it+1 = W
i
t +X
i
t (Pt+1 − Pt) , (2)
where Pt is the date t risky asset’s price. Investors have homogeneous prior beliefs,
v ∼ N (0, σ2v) and θ0 = 0, denoted by F0.
There are n underlying signals for the liquidation value v,
s = v1(n×1) + εs, εs ∼ N
(
0(n×1),Σs
)
, (3)
where 1(n×1) and 0(n×1) denote (n× 1)-dimensional vectors of ones and zeros, respec-
tively. (To distinguish vector-valued variables and parameters from scalar ones, I use
bold-faced letters and numbers throughout the paper to denote the former.) I allow for
correlation among signals meaning that Σs is not necessarily a diagonal matrix.
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Investors do not observe these underlying signals directly. Instead, at every date t
investors observe a private version of those underlying signals:
s˜it = s+ ε
i
t, ε
i
t ∼ N
(
0(n×1),Σs˜,t
)
, (4)
with private noise εit independent across i and t and with independent components
(i.e. Σs˜,t is restricted to be diagonal). The set of covariance matrices {Σs˜,t : 1 ≤ t < T}
defines the timing of exogenous information release: the j-th diagonal entry of Σs˜,t is
equal to ∞ if there is no signal for the j-th underlying signal at date t; and less than
∞ otherwise.
The total information available to investor i and the common information available
to all investors are defined as
F it =
{
F0, s˜
i
τ , Pτ : τ = 1, ..., t
}
, F ct = {F0, Pτ : τ = 1, ..., t} ,
respectively. Unless it is explicitly stated otherwise, all random variables are indepen-
dent of each other and across time.
With the model laid down, I can now define three concepts that I will use throughout
the paper: residual uncertainty, exogenous information and endogenous information.
Residual uncertainty is the amount of uncertainty that would persist after the direct
observation of the underlying signals. Therefore residual uncertainty is a function of
the covariance matrix Σs. If at least one diagonal entry of Σs is zero, the corresponding
underlying signal coincides with the liquidation value, and there is no residual uncer-
tainty.
The second concept, exogenous information, is defined as the information directly
obtained from the observation of s˜it. I say that there is exogenous information at date
t if at least one of the diagonal entries of Σs˜,t is less than ∞.
Finally, endogenous information is the information that is obtained from the observa-
tion of the series of equilibrium prices. Information is endogenously produced whenever
investors have previously observed private exogenous information about at least one un-
derlying signal, and the net supply mean reverts. The mechanism by which endogenous
information is produced is described in detail in Barbosa (2011). But in short, upon
the observation of exogenous information and the equilibrium price, investors form a
belief about the underlying signal and net supply level (the two unknowns that influ-
ence prices). Mean-reversion of net supply makes price changes predictable. And this
allows investors to correct their initial beliefs when they detect a discrepancy between
their forecast and the realized price change. Therefore, investors extract endogenously
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produced information from the observation of the sequence of prices that follow the
initial release of private exogenous information.
3 Equilibrium
The full details on how to determine the equilibrium price and demand functions are
provided in Barbosa (2011). To avoid unnecessary repetition, here I will only present
the price and demand functions without further details on how to derive them.
Theorem 1. In a linear equilibrium, the price function is given by
Pt =
(
Kˆ − pt
)
E [s|F ct ] + pts+ pθ,tθt =
(
Kˆ − pt
)
E [s|F ct ] + ξt (5)
where ξt ≡ pts+ pθ,tθt and the demand function is given by
X it =
1
α
Qtψt, t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1 (6)
where ψt is a vector of state variables defined as
ψt ≡

1
E (s|F it )
E (s|F ct )
E (θt|F
i
t )
 .
The demand of investor i is a linear function of the expectations of the vector of
underlying signals s and the net supply level θt conditional on his information set
F it . This implies that, once investors observe private exogenous information about one
underlying signal, and until that underlying signal is revealed to them, every investor
will demand a different amount of the risky asset. As shown in theorem 2 of Barbosa
(2011), expectations conditional on F it are a linear function of prior beliefs, information
extracted from prices and investor i’s private exogenous information. Since the private
noise in exogenous information (εit) is normally distributed, it follows that expectations
conditional on F it are also normally distributed across investors. And so is investor’s
demand.
Corollary 2. The demand for the risky asset is conditionally normally distributed
across investors. Investors whose private information is more optimistic demand a
larger quantity of the risky asset than those whose private information is more pes-
simistic.
7
Market clearing requires that the average demand matches the per capita supply for
the asset,
∫
i
X it = θt ∀t. The existence of a continuum of investors with conditionally
normally distributed demands implies that there is one investor whose demand is exactly
equal to the average demand. I refer to this investor as the average investor (AI). It
follows that the market clears if and only if the demand of the AI equals the per
capita net supply. This allows us to simplify the analysis in the next sections by
focusing on this representative investor. The next corollary identifies the AI, at date
t, as the investor whose all past and current private signals exactly coincide with the
corresponding underlying signals.
Corollary 3. The market clears at date t if and only if the demand of the investor
who observes s˜iτ = s, ∀τ ≤ t, the average investor (AI), matches the per capita asset’s
net supply. In addition, the beliefs of the AI coincide with the average beliefs across
investors, i.e. E
(
v|FAIt
)
= Ei [E (v|F
i
t )] .
The demand function (6), although parsimonious, is not particularly intuitive. The
next lemma tells us that the risky asset demand can be written as a linear function of
the expectations about all future price changes; or as a linear function of the short-term
myopic demand and all expected future non-myopic demands (the hedging demand).
Lemma 4. The demand function can also be written as
X it =
1
α
T−t∑
τ=1
χ
Q
τ,tE
[
∆Pt+τ |F
i
t
]
, (7)
X it =
1
α
T−t∑
τ=1
ξτ,tE
[
Pt+τ − Pt|F
i
t
]
, (8)
X it = φ
Q
1,tX˜
i
t +
T−t−1∑
τ=1
φ
Q
τ,tE
[
Xt+τ |F
i
t
]
, (9)
where ∆Pt+τ ≡ Pt+τ − Pt+τ−1 is the one-period return and X˜
i
t ≡
E(∆Pt+1|F it)
αV ar(∆Pt+1|F it)
is the
short-term myopic demand. Moreover, χQ1,t > 0 and φ
Q
1,t > 0. All parameters are defined
in Appendix A.2.
Investors trade the asset not only to profit from their expectations about the price
change over the next period, but also to hedge their expected positions at future dates.
Hence the dependence of demand on the entire series of expected price changes. As
discussed in more detail in Appendix C, typically the mean reversion of supply shocks
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makes the next period expected return negatively correlated with all subsequent ex-
pected returns. In that case, hedging future positions requires the investor to take
today a position of the same sign of their expected future short-term position (i.e.,
the same sign of the expected return), and so χQτ,t > 0 for τ ≥ 1. Expected returns
may become positively correlated, leading to χQτ,t < 0, in the period before exogenous
information is released. But only if that exogenous information significantly reduces
the uncertainty about the liquidation value.
The following assumption relates the magnitude of short-term demand with that of
hedging demand.
Assumption 5. The following holds: χQ1,t >
∑T−t
τ=2 χ
Q
τ,t ∀t . That is, demand is strictly
positive (negative) whenever the expected price change over the next period is positive
(negative) and all future expected prices are never below (above) the current price.
This means that if the price change over the next period has the same magnitude but
the opposite sign of the price change from the next period all the way to the liquidation
date, then short-term demand dominates the hedging demand and the overall demand
has the same sign of the short-term demand. Note that, in this case, the asset has only
upside or only downside potential, and so it is expectable that investors take advantage
of it with a short or long position in the asset, respectively. However intuitive this
assumption might be, it does not hold true for generic return processes. In Appendix
D I discuss the validity of this assumption for the endogenous return process implied
by the model used in this paper.
4 Discrepancy between Average Prices and Expecta-
tions: The Case of a Single Underlying Signal
I will now use the model introduced in the previous sections to study in which circum-
stances and in which direction the average price differs from the average expectation of
the liquidation value. In this section, the focus will be on the case of a single underly-
ing signal s. Note that, even though there is a single underlying signal, investors may
observe several private signals based on that same underlying signal at different dates.
The case where investors observe private signals based on multiple underlying signals
is addressed in the next section.
For convenience, from now on I will loosely use the expression “prices are closer to
fundamentals than expectations” or vice-versa as meaning that “the average (over net
supply level) price is closer to the fundamental value than the average (over net supply
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level and investors) expectation of the liquidation value”. I will also refer to the average
expectation of the liquidation value simply as the average expectation.
This setup with a single underlying signal is the closest to the one used by Cespa and
Vives (2012). The main difference relative to their work is that I relax the assumption
that investors observe exogenous information for s in every period (i.e. I allow Σs˜,t =∞
at some dates t), and consider more than 2 trading dates (T > 3). The former allows
me to identify the existence of additional exogenous information, following an initial
release of private exogenous information, as a crucial factor to have prices closer to
fundamentals than expectations. In turn, the latter allows me to find that the prices can
be closer to fundamentals in some periods, while expectations are closer to fundamentals
in other periods.
I show that, following an initial release of private exogenous information, either
(i) mean-reversion of net supply or (ii) a combination of residual uncertainty with an
additional release of exogenous information create a discrepancy between prices and
expectations. In both cases, the root cause for this discrepancy between prices and
expectations is the existence of short-term speculative trading opportunities. Moreover,
I show that prices differ from expectations in a different way depending on whether (i),
(ii) or both occur. Mean-reversion of net supply tends to bring expectations closer to
fundamentals than prices after the release of private exogenous information. By the
contrary, residual uncertainty and an incoming release of exogenous information tends
to make prices closer to fundamentals than expectations before the new information is
released. Figure 1 previews these results.
Without loss of generality, I assume henceforth that the initial private exogenous
information is released at date 1. Since there is only one underlying signal, the funda-
mental value of the risky asset (FV ) is defined as the expected liquidation value given
the direct observation of the underlying signal, and is independent of t. The next lemma
provides the expressions for the fundamental value, average price (Eθ (Pt)) and average
expectation of the liquidation value (Eθ,i [E (v|F
i
t )] ≡ Eθ
[
E
(
v|FAIt
)]
). All averages are
over the net supply level and investors, and conditional on the underlying signal s.
Lemma 6. When there is a single underlying signal s and exogenous information about
that signal is released at date 1, the date t fundamental value, average price and average
10
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Figure 1: Discrepancy between the average price, the average expectation of the liqui-
dation value and the fundamental value. This figure shows the discrepancy between the average
price, the average expectation of the liquidation value and the fundamental value when: there is mean-
reversion of net supply (panel A); there is an incoming release of additional exogenous information
(panel B); and the previous two occur simultaneously (panel C). In all cases, private exogenous infor-
mation is released at date 1, and there is residual uncertainty. In panel A, ρ = 0.9 and Σs˜,20 = 10
10; in
panel B, ρ = 1 and Σs˜,20 = 0.1; and in panel C, ρ = 0.9 and Σs˜,20 = 0.1. The rest of the parametriza-
tion is common to all panels: T = 41, n = 1, σ2v = 0.25, Σs = 0.5, Σs˜,1 = 1, Σs˜,t = 10
10 ∀t \ {1, 20},
σ2θ = 0.1, α = 2, s = 3. The case of a negative underlying signal is the symmetric.
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expectation of the liquidation value conditional on s are given by
FV = Kˆs
Eθ (Pt) =
(
Kˆ − pt
)
Eθ [E (s|F
c
t )] + pts
Eθ,i
[
E
(
v|F it
)]
= Kˆ
(
1− Γˆt
)
Eθ [E (s|F
c
t )] + KˆΓˆts
where Kˆ = σ
2
v
σ2v+σ
2
s
and Γˆt = V ar (v|F
i
t )
∑t
k=1
1
σ2
i,k
, σ2i,t ≡ Σs˜,t.
Furthermore, the following holds:
(i) The average price and the average expectation of the liquidation value are biased
toward the prior belief about the liquidation value;
(ii) The average price is closer to (further away from) the fundamental value than
the average expectation of the liquidation value is if and only if prices exhibit under-
(over-)reliance on public information relatively to the optimal statistical weight, i.e.,
Kˆ − pt < (>) Kˆ
(
1− Γˆt
)
.
This result establishes the one to one link between the (relative) under-reliance of
prices on public information and prices being the best estimator of the fundamental
value when there is a single underlying signal. The less weight prices put on public
information, i.e. E (st|F
c
t ), the less they overweight the prior belief about v, and the
closer they are to the fundamental value, compared to average expectations. A similar
result is provided by Cespa and Vives (2012). However, this result is specific to the
case of a single underlying signal.
4.1 The Base Case: Exogenous Information at a Single Date
and No Mean-Reversion of Net Supply
In order to understand why, and in which direction, the average price deviates from the
average expectation of the liquidation value, I start by considering the simplest case:
private exogenous information is available only at date 1 and there is no mean-reversion
of net supply (ρ = 1).
In this stripped down version of the model, the average price always coincides with
the average expectation. And the reason is that investors do not expect prices to change
in the periods before the liquidation date, and so do not engage in short-term trading.
As we will see in more detail in the next subsections, short-term trading is crucial
to “deviate investors’ attentions” from the discrepancy between the average price and
the average expectation, allowing this discrepancy to persist. This is easy to grasp by
looking at equation (8). When price changes are not expected in the periods before the
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liquidation date, then demand depends only on the expectation of the liquidation value
and the current price, that is
X it =
1
α
ξT−t,tE
(
v − Pt|F
i
t
)
,
just like in the static model (in this case ξT−t,t = V ar (v|F
i
t )
−1
)
In the absence of the arrival of additional exogenous information, the only event
with impact on prices are changes in net supply. And although prices do change every
period in response to changes in net supply, they do not change in a predictable direction
because there is no mean-reversion of net supply change. Therefore, the expected change
in net supply and prices is zero. This means that, in every period, investors trade as
if they hold their position until the liquidation date. Since, on average, the net supply
level is zero, this means that the AI (the investor whose demand has to match the net
supply level for the market to clear) has to demand zero. But this only happens if the
price matches the AI’s expectation of the liquidation value, that is, if the price coincides
with the average expectation of the liquidation value,
Eθ
(
XAIt
)
=
1
α
ξT−t,tEθ
[
E
(
v − Pt|F
AI
t
)]
= Eθ (θt)
⇔
1
α
ξT−t,tEθ
[
E
(
v|FAIt
)
− Pt
]
= 0
⇔ Eθ (Pt) = Eθ
[
E
(
v|FAIt
)]
= Eθ,i
[
E
(
v|F it
)]
.
Therefore, to create a discrepancy between average price and the average expecta-
tion of the liquidation value investors need to engage in short-term trading. This can be
achieved either by introducing mean-reversion of net supply, which leads to endogenous
production of information, or by allowing the arrival of additional exogenous informa-
tion combined with residual uncertainty. This is the plan for the next two subsections
and, as we will see, these two changes to the base case will cause the average price to
deviated from the average expectation of the liquidation value in different directions.
4.2 Mean-Reversion of Net Supply: Endogenous Information
The first modification to the base case is the introduction of mean-reversion in the
net supply (ρ < 1). In this setting, investors expect the net supply to change in the
direction of its unconditional mean. And, from price function (5), this means that
investors expect prices to change as well, which leads to short-term trading. The only
exception is when investors believe that the current supply level is at its unconditional
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mean.
Obviously, when averaging over supply shocks, the net supply equals its uncondi-
tional mean and there is no net supply changes. But, in this case, do investors believe
that net supply is equal to its unconditional mean? The answer is no. And this is
the reason why, on average, investors expect price changes that lead them to engage in
short-term trading which, in turn, allows the average price to diverge from the average
expectation.
To understand why, on average, investors expect net supply (and thus prices) to
change when in fact it does not, we need to understand what happens when investors
observe private exogenous information. To simplify the exposition, let us focus the
attention on the average investor (AI). Like any other investor, the AI has two pieces
of information: his private signal for s, s˜i1 = s + ε
i
1; and the informational equivalent
to the contemporaneous equilibrium price, ξ1 = s +
pθ,1
p1
θ1.
4 However, there are three
unknowns to the AI: the underlying signal s; the idiosyncratic error of his signal εi1;
and the current net supply level θ1. This means that there is an infinite number of
combinations of these three unknowns that can generate the two observations: for a
given s˜i, the larger the underlying signal, the smaller the error in the signal (i.e. the less
positive or more negative the error is); and for a given price, the larger the underlying
signal, the larger the net supply level.5 Therefore, it is impossible to learn the value of
s and θ1 with certainty at date 1. Instead, the AI has to estimate the value of these
three unknowns.
The AI always observe s˜AI1 = s, although he does not know that (since he does not
know that he is the AI). And, when averaging over net supply shocks, he, like any other
investor, observes ξ1 = s. However, because both signals for s are noisy, the AI gives
some weight to his prior belief when forming his posterior belief about s. This means
that, on average, his belief about s is biased toward the prior, i.e.
∣∣Eθ [E (s|FAI1 )]∣∣ < |s|.
This is evident from the expression for the posterior belief about s derived for a 3-period
model without residual uncertainty (see Barbosa, 2011),
E
(
s|F i1
)
=
1
σ2v
0 + 1
α2σ4i,1σ
2
θ
ξ1 +
1
σ2i,1
s˜i1
1
σ2v
+ 1
α2σ4i,1σ
2
θ
+ 1
σ2i,1
, Eθ,i
[
E
(
s|F i1
)]
=
1
α2σ4i,1σ
2
θ
+ 1
σ2i,1
1
σ2v
+ 1
α2σ4i,1σ
2
θ
+ 1
σ2i,1
s
where σ2i,1 ≡ Σs˜,1. As a consequence, when averaging over net supply shocks, the
4When there is a single underlying signal it is convenient use this definition of ξt, in which case the
price function (5) becomes Pt =
(
Kˆ − pt
)
E [s|Fct ] + ptξt.
5This follows from
pθ,1
p1
< 0, which gives us the expected negative relation between supply and
prices.
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AI believes that the net supply was different from its unconditional mean of zero,
Eθ
[
E
(
θ1|F
AI
1
)]
6= E (θ) = 0.6 Specifically, in the 3-period example of Barbosa (2011),
Eθ,i
[
E
(
θ1|F
i
1
)]
= −
V ar (v|F i1)
ασ2i,1σ
2
v
s.
However, Eθ
[
E
(
θ1|F
AI
1
)]
6= E (θ) = 0 only if: (i) the underlying signal s does not
coincide with its prior belief (s 6= 0); (ii) the prior belief about s is informative (σ2v <∞);
(iii) the exogenous information received at date 1 is informative (σ2i,1 <∞); and (iv) the
underlying signal is not learned exactly at date 1 (V ar (v|F i1) > 0, which requires that
α > 0, σ2θ > 0 and σ
2
i,1 > 0, i.e. the initial exogenous information has to be private).
So, because on average the AI expects a non-zero net supply level when exoge-
nous information is released, he expects the net supply to mean-revert in the following
periods, which has an impact on future prices. For example, following the release of
exogenous information based on a positive underlying signal (s > 0), the AI believes
that the net supply was negative. Then he expects the net supply to increase in the
following periods as it converges to its unconditional mean of zero. And, as a result, he
expects prices to decrease in the short-run. In the 3-period example,
Eθ,i
[
E
(
θ2 − θ1|F
i
1
)]
= (1− ρ)
V ar (v|F i1)
ασ2i,1σ
2
v
s > 0
Eθ,i
[
E
(
∆P2|F
i
1
)]
= −
V ar (v|F i2)V ar (v|F
i
1)
(
1− ρ+ α2σ2θσ
2
i,1
)
α2σ2θ
σ2v + α
2σ2θσ
2
i,1
(
σ2v + σ
2
i,1 + α
2σ2θσ
2
i,1σ
2
v
) (1− ρ) s < 0.
To profit from this expectation, the AI takes a short position. However, since the
net supply is in fact zero, his demand has to be zero as well, otherwise the market
does not clear. This requires that his hedging demand exactly offsets his short-term
speculative demand. But that cannot happen if the price equals his expectation of the
liquidation value. This is very easy to see in a 3-period model. Using equation (8) we
have
X it =
1
α
ξ1,1E
(
P2 − P1|F
i
t
)
+
1
α
ξ2,1E
(
v − P1|F
i
t
)
.
6Another way to see this is the following. Consider the realized scenario
(
s, εi1, θ1
)
= (s, 0, 0) and
that, without loss of generality, s > 0 = E (v). This scenario implies a deviation of s from its prior
mean of 0, but no deviation of εi1 and of θ1 from their prior means. All three variables have a normal
prior distribution and, as we know, the only point at which the probability density function of a normal
distribution is zero is at its mean. This means that the alternative scenario
(
s− ǫ, ǫ, p1
pθ,1
ǫ
)
, ǫ ' 0 is
marginally more likely than the realized scenario (s, 0, 0) and so, on average, the AI believes the price
increase that was exclusively due to s > 0 was in fact partly explained by decrease in the net supply.
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When there is no residual uncertainty it can be shown that ξ1,1 and ξ2,1 are strictly
positive (see Appendix A.4). The first term corresponds to the short-term demand,
which in our example is negative, and the second to the hedging demand. It is clear
that the market clears only if the hedging demand is positive, which means that the
date 1 price has to be smaller than the expectation of the liquidation value,
Eθ
[
E
(
v|FAIt
)
− P1
]
= −
ξ1,1
ξ2,1
Eθ
[
E
(
P2 − P1|F
AI
t
)]
=
V ar (v|F i2)V ar (v|F
i
1)
[
σ2v + α
2σ2θσ
2
i,1
(
σ2i,1 + ρσ
2
v
)]
σ2i,1σ
2
v
[
σ2v + α
2σ2θσ
2
i,1
(
σ2v + σ
2
i,1 + α
2σ2θσ
2
i,1σ
2
v
)] (1− ρ) s > 0.
When there are more than 3 periods, the intuition remains the same. The hedging
demand has to be large enough to offset the short-term speculative demand. But once
again, that does not happen if the current price equals the AI’s expectation of the
liquidation value. If that were the case, the AI would expect some of the future prices
to be below (above) the current price, but none above it, if s > 0 (s < 0). For the
AI to demand the market clearing zero quantity, he would have to ignore the short-
term trading opportunities. Therefore, under assumption 5, the current price has to be
below (above) the AI’s expectation of the liquidation value when s > 0 (s < 0), so that
the hedging demand offsets the short-term demand. In other words, conditional on s,
expectations will have to be closer to fundamentals than prices.
By now it is clear that the AI anticipates short-term trading opportunities only if
he expects the current net supply level to differ from its unconditional mean. As we
just saw, this is the case at the date of release of private exogenous information. But
since there is endogenous production of information, is this still the case in the periods
that follow? On average, yes. This is so because endogenous information allows the AI
to learn about the liquidation value only gradually, without ever knowing exactly its
value. If investors were to learn exactly the liquidation value, they would be able to
deduce the level of net supply from prices. And then, on average, they would see that
the net supply is zero and would not expect short-term trading opportunities.
But in reality, this is never the case. Each period investors obtain an additional
noisy signal for the liquidation value from the contemporaneous price (ξt, which on
average is unbiased i.e. Eθ (ξt) = v), by comparing their forecast with the realized price.
Forecast errors can originate from wrong previous expectations, reason why investors
can extract additional information from each successive price. However, they can also
be the result of a contemporaneous supply shock, which introduces noise. Because all
signals observed are noisy, investors always put some weight into their prior beliefs. This
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Figure 2: The average expectation of the net supply level and the discrepancy between
the average price and the average expectation of the liquidation value. This figure illustrates
the relation between the the average expectation of the net supply level and the difference between the
average expectation of the liquidation value and the average price when there is mean-reversion of net
supply. In both panels, s > 0, and so positive values of Eθ
[
E
(
v|FAIt
)
− Pt
]
mean that expectations
are closer to fundamentals than prices. In panel A the mean-reversion of net supply is fast (ρ = 0), and
lots of endogenous information is produced, whereas in panel B the mean-reversion is slow (ρ = 0.9).
The rest of the parametrization is common to both panels: T = 41, n = 1, σ2v = 0.25, Σs = 0, Σs˜,1 = 1,
Σs˜,t = 10
10 (1 < t ≤ T − 1), σ2θ = 0.1, α = 2, s = 1. The case of a negative underlying signal (s < 0)
is the symmetric of the case depicted.
means that, on average, AI’s beliefs about the liquidation value remain biased toward
prior beliefs. And this implies that the AI always believes that the contemporaneous
net supply level is negative.7 However, the relative weight investors put on prior beliefs
when forming posterior beliefs declines as time passes and more prices are observed.
Thus, beliefs about the underlying signal and the contemporaneous net supply level
become more accurate as time passes, without ever being perfectly accurate. In the
3-period example,
Eθ
[
E
(
s|F i2
)]
=
1
α2σ4i,1σ
2
θ
+ 1
σ2i,1
+ (1−ρ)
2
α2σ4i,1σ
2
θ
1
σ2v
+ 1
α2σ4i,1σ
2
θ
+ 1
σ2i,1
+ (1−ρ)
2
α2σ4i,1σ
2
θ
s > Eθ
[
E
(
s|F i2
)]
Eθ
[
E
(
θ2|F
i
2
)]
= −
V ar (v|F i2)
ασ2i,1σ
2
v
s > Eθ
[
E
(
θ1|F
i
1
)]
.
The gradual but incomplete convergence of beliefs to the truth implies that the
AI always expects short-term trading opportunities to exist, even though the expected
profitability of these short-term trading opportunities decreases as time passes. More-
over, the riskiness of these short-term trading opportunities increases as the liquidation
7On average, Eθ (ξt) = v. Since ξt is adapted to F
i
t , we have ξt = E
(
ξt|F
i
t
)
and so
Eθ
[
E
(
v +
pθ,t
pt
θt|F
i
t
)]
= v ⇔ Eθ
[
E
(
θt|F
i
t
)]
= pt
pθ,t
{
v − Eθ
[
E
(
v|F it
)]}
. If v > 0 and v −
Eθ
[
E
(
v|F it
)]
> 0, it then follows that Eθ
[
E
(
θt|F
i
t
)]
< 0 since pt
pθ,t
< 0.
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date comes closer, since the chance that a supply shock will not revert completely until
the liquidation date increases. Therefore, although average prices are always worse pre-
dictors of the fundamental value compared to average expectations, the gap between
these two decreases as time passes. This is illustrated in panel A of figure 1 and in
figure 2, for the case of a positive underlying signal (the case of a negative underlying
signal is the symmetric).
In panel A of figure 2, the mean-reversion of net supply is fast, which generates lots
of endogenous information. As a result, there is little uncertainty in the periods close
to the liquidation value. In this case, it is the convergence of the average expectation of
the net supply level to zero, as opposed to the increased riskiness of short-term trading,
the most important factor in the decreased attractiveness of short-term trading as
the liquidation date approaches. In panel B the mean-reversion of net supply is low,
and the opposite is true: the increase in riskiness is the dominant force. As we can
see, the difference between the average expectation and the average price (solid line)
converges to zero much faster than it would if the liquidation date took place in a more
distant future (dotted line), and much faster than the AI’s expectation of the net supply
converges to zero (dashed line).
So, we already know that mean-reversion of net supply is crucial to obtain a discrep-
ancy between the average price and the average expectation when there is no residual
uncertainty. But how do different speeds of mean-reversion and different levels of resid-
ual uncertainty affect this result? Figure 3 provides the answer. Panel A shows that
an increase in the speed of mean-reversion has a non-monotonic impact in the differ-
ence between the average expectation and the average price. This happens because, on
the one hand, for a given expectation of the current net supply level, a faster mean-
reversion increases the expected profitability of the short-term trading opportunities.
But, on the other hand, the faster the mean-reversion, the more endogenous information
is produced. The latter means that the expectation of the current net supply level will
be closer to zero at all dates, which decreases the expected profitability of the short-
term trading. This is specially true in the periods more distant from the initial release
of exogenous information, since more endogenous information has been accumulated.
The first effect, which tends to increase the divergence between the average expectation
and the average price, dominates only when ρ is close to 1, otherwise the second effect,
which tend to decrease that divergence, dominates.
In turn, panel B shows us that the existence of residual uncertainty has no effect
on the qualitative results discussed previously. However, because residual uncertainty
increases the riskiness of short-term trading, the difference between the average expec-
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Figure 3: Comparative statics on the discrepancy between the average price and the
average expectation of the liquidation value when there is mean-reversion of net supply.
This figure shows how the speed of mean-reversion of net supply (panel A) and the level of residual
uncertainty (panel B) impacts the difference between the average expectation of the liquidation value
and the average price when the underlying signal is positive (the negative case is the symmetric) and
there is mean-reversion of net supply. Positive values mean that expectations are closer to fundamentals
than prices. In panel A ρ ∈ [0, 1], Σs = 0 and s = 1. In panel B ρ = 0.8,Σs ∈ [0, 0.25] and s is adjusted
so that the fundamental value remains unchanged as the level of residual uncertainty changes (higher
residual uncertainty requires higher s). The remaining parametrization is common to both panels:
T = 41, n = 1, σ2v = 0.25, Σs˜,1 = 1, Σs˜,t = 10
10 (1 < t ≤ T − 1), σ2θ = 0.1, α = 2.
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tation and the average price decreases with the level of residual uncertainty.
To sum up, the release of private exogenous information based on an underlying
signal that differs from investors’ prior beliefs (s 6= 0) and the mean-reversion of net
supply are the two key ingredients to create a discrepancy between the average price
and the average expectation of the liquidation value. The former makes the average
investor believe that the price movement contemporaneous to the release of exogenous
information was partly driven by noise/liquidity demand. And the latter makes the
average investor expect liquidity traders to gradually exit the market. This creates an
opportunity to profit from liquidity traders on the short-run, which diverts attentions
from the long-run. As a consequence, the average price differs from the average expec-
tation of the liquidation value: the latter is always closer to the fundamental value than
the former.
An alternative way of looking at this is the following. When investors expect to trade
in the short-term, they care not only about the final liquidation value, but also about
intermediate prices. Since prices reflect the opinions of all other investors about the
liquidation value, each investor has to forecast others’ opinions. These opinions reflect
both the common prior information (which is public information) and the private signal.
As Allen et al. (2006) put it:
“Now suppose that the individual is asked to guess what the average
expectation of the asset’s payoff is. Since he knows that others have also
observed the same public signal, the public signal is a better predictor of
average opinion; he will put more weight on the public signal than on the
private signal. Thus if individuals’ willingness to pay for an asset is related
to their expectations of the average opinion, then we will tend to have asset
prices overweighting public information relative to the private information.”
This over-reliance on public information then causes the average price to deviate more
from the fundamental value than the average expectation of the liquidation value.
Finally, it is worth noting that, although it is not endogenous information per se that
makes average prices worse predictors of the fundamental value than average expecta-
tions, the latter only happens when there is endogenous production of information. In
this sense we can link over-reliance on public information to the existence of endogenous
information.
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4.3 Release of Additional Exogenous Information
The second modification to the base case is the release of additional exogenous informa-
tion, which I consider here in place of the mean-reversion of net supply. I will analyze
a version of the model incorporating these two features simultaneously in the next sub-
section. I assume that there are two dates at which exogenous information is released.
The generalization to a larger number of information release dates is straightforward.
In addition, I assume that the second date of information release is the last trading date
(T − 1). This is without loss of generality since, as we saw in Section 4.1, when there is
no additional exogenous information to be released in the future and no mean-reversion
of net supply, the average price and average expectation of the liquidation date coincide
at all dates. Therefore, exogenous information is assumed to be released at dates 1 and
T − 1.
As we saw previously, investors need to engage in short-term trading for the average
price to diverge from the average expectation of the liquidation value. For the former to
happen, though, investors need to expect short-term price movements. In this setting,
the only thing that can generate predictable short-term price changes is the incoming
release of exogenous information. So, let us examine the expected impact of additional
exogenous information... on investors’ demands. I will get to prices later on.
Every investor anticipates two effects of the release of additional information: (i) the
beliefs about the liquidation value will become more homogeneous which, for a given
price, tends to make investors’ demands more homogeneous as well; (ii) beliefs about the
liquidation value become more precise, which leads investors to trade more aggressively
based on their expectations, thus making their demands more heterogeneous. Therefore,
whether the release of additional information makes demands more homogeneous or
more heterogeneous, depends on which of these two effects dominate.
Curiously, when there is no residual uncertainty, the two effects exactly offset each
other. That is, every investor expects the release of additional exogenous information
to have no effect on the demand of every other investor. Investors may expect prices
to change though,
E
(
∆Pt+τ |F
i
t
)
= α
[
V ar
(
v|F it+τ−1
)
− V ar
(
v|F it+τ
)]
Xt.
But since investors do not expect their demand to change, they will not take advan-
tage of this expected price change, which means that they never engage in short-term
speculative trading. Actually, it is easy to show that the demand function in this case
coincides with the demand function we obtain in a static model or in the base case,
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that is,
X it =
E (v|F it )− Pt
αV ar (v|F it )
. (10)
Focusing now on our AI, averaging over net supply shocks it follows that, ∀τ
Eθ,i
[
E
(
∆Pt+τ |F
i
t
)]
= α
[
V ar
(
v|FAIt+τ−1
)
− V ar
(
v|F iAIt+τ
)]
Eθ,i (Xt) = 0
and so
Eθ,i
[
E
(
v|F it
)]
= Eθ (Pt) .
Therefore, when there is no residual uncertainty, the average price equals the average
expectation of the liquidation value at all dates.
When there is residual uncertainty, though, the first effect always dominates the sec-
ond, meaning that investors expect demands to become more homogeneous in response
to the release of additional exogenous information. This happens because investors
receive information about the underlying signal and not about the liquidation value.
When there is residual uncertainty, the former is only a noisy signal for the latter. What
this means is that, in relative terms, the new information resolves less uncertainty about
the liquidation value than it resolves uncertainty about the underlying signal. As a con-
sequence, the trading aggressiveness increases less than it would increase if there were
no residual uncertainty and the underlying signal coincided with the liquidation value.
Hence, the first effect dominates. But the simplest way to illustrate why residual un-
certainty leads to more homogeneous demands, is to consider what happens when the
incoming exogenous information resolves all uncertainty about the underlying signal.
In this case all investors will share the same beliefs. When there is residual uncertainty,
the asset remains risky, and so in equilibrium every investor demands the same quan-
tity. Obviously, demands become more homogeneous. In contrast, if there is no residual
uncertainty, then the asset becomes riskless. This makes investors indifferent between
demanding any quantity in equilibrium, and so they can keep their previous demand
unchanged and the market still clears.
So, what is the implication of expecting more homogeneous demands? The answer
is: short-term speculative trading which leads to a divergence between the average price
and the average expectation of the liquidation value. To show this, let us focus on the
AI and on the average case. Also, to simplify the exposition, suppose that s > 0. As
we saw in the previous subsection, following the initial release of private exogenous
information at date 1, the AI will believe that the net supply level was negative, and
form an expectation about the underlying signal that is biased toward his prior belief.
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The latter means that he believes the idiosyncratic error of his signal was positive.
That is the AI believes that the majority of investors received less optimistic signals
and, in particular, that the average investor his somebody else who has observed a less
optimistic signal. Even though there will be some endogenous production of information
going on (more on this later), the AI will maintain these qualitative beliefs at all dates
until additional exogenous information is released.
Let us start by considering what happens to the average price and average expec-
tation at the date immediately before the release of new information, date T − 2. As
mentioned before, on average the AI believes that the current net supply level is nega-
tive. Because he expects demands to become more homogeneous following the release
of new information at date T − 1, he expects his own date T − 1 demand to decrease
and become negative (recall that market equilibrium requires that his demand be zero
at date T − 2). Since at date T − 1 we are back to the base case, demands are as in the
static model, and given by equation (10). Therefore, if the AI expects to demand a neg-
ative quantity, he has to expect a price above his current expectation of the liquidation
value, that is, Eθ
[
E
(
∆PT |F
AI
T−2
)]
< 0.
Market clearing at date T − 2 requires the AI to demand zero. Thus, the short-
term demand has to offset the hedging demand that results from the expectation of a
negative demand at T−1. The sign of the hedging demand will depend on the precision
of the exogenous information released at date T − 1. If information is precise enough,
the correlation between ∆PT−1 and ∆PT will be positive, resulting in a positive hedging
demand. But hedging demand can also be null or negative if information is not precise
enough. Let us consider first the case of negative hedging demand. In this case, the
short-term demand has to be positive, which means that Eθ
[
E
(
∆PT−1|F
AI
T−2
)]
> 0.
However, under assumption 5, the hedging demand offsets the short-term demand only
if Eθ
[
E
(
∆PT−1 +∆PT |F
AI
T−2
)]
< 0, and so we obtain that
Eθ (PT−2) > Eθ
[
E
(
v|FAIT−2
)]
.
The case of positive or null hedging demand is straightforward. In these cases,
market clearing requires a weakly negative short-term demand, which implies that
Eθ
[
E
(
∆PT−1|F
AI
T−2
)]
≤ 0. It is then immediate that Eθ
[
E
(
∆PT−1 +∆PT |F
AI
T−2
)]
< 0
and so Eθ (PT−2) > Eθ
[
E
(
v|FAIT−2
)]
. Hence, in contrast to what happens when there
is mean-reversion of net supply, the average price is closer to the fundamental value
than the average expectation of the liquidation value in the date immediately before
the release of additional exogenous information.
23
10 20 30 40−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Panel A: Price discrepancy and expected net supply
Time
 
 
Eθ
[
E
(
v|FAIt
)
− Pt
]
Eθ
[
E
(
θt|F
AI
t
)]
10 20 30 400.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
Panel B: 3 incoming releases of information
Time
 
 
Eθ (Pt)
Eθ
[
E
(
v|FAIt
)]
Figure 4: Discrepancy between the average price and the average expectation of the
liquidation value. This figure shows how the average expectation of the liquidation value differs
from the average price when there is an incoming release of information based on the same underlying
signal and the underlying signal is positive (the negative case is the symmetric). Panel A shows
the relation between that difference and the average expectation of the net supply level when new
information is released at date 20, with Σs˜,20 = 0.1 and Σs˜,t = 10
10 ∀t \ {1, 20}. Negative values of
Eθ
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mean that prices are closer to fundamentals than expectations. Panel B shows that
difference when there is more than one incoming release of information, with Σs˜,10 = Σs˜,20 = Σs˜,30 = 1
and Σs˜,t = 10
10 ∀t\{1, 10, 20, 30}. In both panels, the remaining parametrization is the same: T = 41,
n = 1, ρ = 1, σ2v = 0.25, Σs = 0.5, Σs˜,1 = 1, σ
2
θ = 0.1, α = 2, s = 3.
This is also true at all dates between the two releases of information. However, the
difference between the average price and the average expectation increases with the
proximity to the date where the additional exogenous information is released (see panel
B of figure 1). This is explained by the endogenous information that is produced by the
speculative trading. As we just saw, investors trade on their expectation of the impact
of new exogenous information on prices. Obviously that expectation is based on their
own private information. Therefore, the increased trading aggressiveness that stems
from short-term trading leaks some of investors’ private information into prices every
period. This means that, as the date of release of the new information approaches, the
asset becomes less risky. Because the AI believes that the negative supply is negative,
he expects this risk reduction to have a negative impact on price. However, unlike what
the AI believes, on average the net supply level is in fact zero, and so the risk reduction
has no impact on prices whatsoever. This means that the AI’s price forecast always
errs on the low side. The AI knows that only two things could have gone wrong: either
he underestimated the previous period net supply level, which lead him to expect a
stronger price adjustment in response to the risk reduction; or the contemporaneous
supply shock was negative, offsetting the reduction in the riskiness of holding the asset
with an increase in the magnitude of the quantity that needs to be held. Like in previous
situations, the AI attributes his forecast error in part to each of these two factors. Thus,
even though he corrects for an underestimation of the previous period net supply, he
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now believes that the net supply is even more negative than before.8 Therefore, the AI
now expects a larger reduction in his demand at date T − 1 than before, which implies
that he expects a larger discrepancy between PT−1 and Eθ
[
E
(
v|FAIT−τ
)]
. And this
translates into a bigger difference between PT−τ and Eθ
[
E
(
v|FAIT−τ
)]
. Figure 4 provides
an illustration. In addition, panel B confirms that, as mentioned in the beginning of this
subsection, all the results generalize to the case where there is more than one incoming
release of information.
We just saw that the discrepancy between the average expectation and the average
price stems from the combination of incoming release of exogenous information and
residual uncertainty. The next question is how does that discrepancy change with the
precision of incoming information and with the level of residual uncertainty. Obviously,
the expected price impact of the incoming information increases with its precision.
Thus, unsurprisingly the discrepancy between the average price and the average ex-
pectation increases with the precision of the incoming information, as we can see from
panel A of figure 5.
In turn, as we can see from panel B, the increase in the level of residual uncertainty
has a non-monotonic impact on the difference between the average expectation and the
average price. The reason for this is that an increase in the level of residual uncer-
tainty produces two effects on the profitability of short-term trading, and thus on the
discrepancy between the average price and the average expectation. On the one hand,
the higher the level of residual uncertainty, the more homogeneous the demands are
expected to become after the release of the new information. As we saw, this tends to
increase the expected profitability of short-term trading. But, on the other hand, as
the residual uncertainty increases, the relevance of the incoming information decreases,
since it resolves a smaller fraction of the overall uncertainty. Therefore, the expected
price impact of the new information tends to decrease, which decreases the expected
profitability of short-term trading. The first effect dominates only when the residual
uncertainty is not too large, reason why initially the discrepancy between the average
price and the average expectation increases with the level of residual uncertainty. But
then after some point the second effect takes over and this difference starts decreasing
with the level of residual uncertainty.
Summing up, the release of additional exogenous information based on the same
8This is the case because endogenous information is very noisy, and so investors attribute the bulk of
the forecast error to a contemporaneous supply shock. If endogenous information were more accurate,
investors would put more weight on the hypothesis of wrong beliefs, and would would make a stronger
correction in their beliefs. In that case, the expectation of the net supply level could become less
negative. However, numerical results suggest that this is never the case.
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Figure 5: Comparative statics on the discrepancy between the average price and the
average expectation of the liquidation value when there is an incoming release of exoge-
nous information. This figure shows how the precision of incoming information (panel A) and the
level of residual uncertainty (panel B) impacts the difference between the average expectation of the
liquidation value and the average price when the underlying signal is positive (the negative case is
the symmetric) and there is an incoming release of exogenous information. Negative values mean that
prices are closer to fundamentals than expectations. In panel A Σs˜,20 ∈ [0, 10], Σs = 0.5 and s = 3.
I panel B: Σs ∈ [0, 100], Σs˜,20 = 1 and s is adjusted adjusted so that the fundamental value remains
unchanged as the level of residual uncertainty changes. The remaining parametrization is common to
both panels: T = 41, n = 1, ρ = 1, σ2v = 0.25, Σs = 0.5, Σs˜i,1 = 1, Σs˜,t = 10
10 ∀t \ {1, 20}, σ2θ = 0.1,
α = 2.
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underlying signal as previously released private exogenous information, and residual
uncertainty, are the two key ingredients to create a discrepancy between the average
price and the average expectation, and bring the former closer to the fundamental
value than the latter. Together, these two factors lead investors to speculate on the
price impact of incoming information, engaging in short-term speculative trading. This
diverts attentions from the long-run and allows a divergence in the average price and
average expectation of the liquidation value to persist.
As in the case of mean-reversion of net supply (previous subsection), investors care
not only about the liquidation value, but also about intermediate prices. For this reason,
investors have to forecast the opinions of other investors. But in this case, forecasting
the opinions of others does not call for overweighting public information. On the one
hand, all investors observed the same public information (the common prior), and a
private signal. Although any given investor knows what the public information was,
he can only make an inaccurate estimate of what those private signals might have
been, hence the tendency to over-rely on public information. But, on the other hand,
all investors will observe another private signal related to the private signal already
observed. Since the incoming private signal can be forecasted with the previously
observed private signal, investors will overweight their private signal when forming their
beliefs about others’ beliefs. Therefore, prices will under-rely on public information.
This is what Allen et al. (2006) overlook when they asserted that short-term spec-
ulative trading always leads to over-reliance on public information. Even though in
their model there is release of exogenous information at all dates, there is no residual
uncertainty and net supply mean reverts. This is why they always obtain over-reliance
but never under-reliance on public information.
4.4 The General Case: Mean-Reversion of Net Supply and Re-
lease of Additional Exogenous Information
Now it is time to bring the two modifications to the base case considered in the previous
subsections together. This corresponds to the setting in Cespa and Vives (2012), who
never separate mean-reversion of net supply from the release of additional exogenous
information. In a 3-period model, they find that date 1 prices over-rely on public
information (that is prices are further away from fundamentals than expectations) when
net supply quickly reverts to its mean and residual uncertainty is low, and that prices
under-rely on public information otherwise. Since mean-reversion of net supply causes
over-reliance on public information, and additional exogenous information coupled to
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residual uncertainty causes under-reliance on public information, their result tells us
the conditions in which each of the two effects dominates.
On the one hand, a persistent net supply means that the trading opportunities from
changes in liquidity driven demand are bleak. In this case, and in the absence of ad-
ditional exogenous information, the average price would be very close to the average
expectation, specially in the dates far away from the release of the initial exogenous
information. On the other hand, if relatively precise exogenous information is to be
released in the future, and if residual uncertainty is relatively high, then trading oppor-
tunities based on the impact of the incoming information are substantial. In this case,
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Figure 6: Comparative statics on the discrepancy between the average price and the
average expectation of the liquidation value when there is mean-reversion of net supply
and an incoming release of exogenous information. This figure shows how the precision of
precision of incoming information (panel A), the level of residual uncertainty (panel B) and the speed
of mean-reversion of net supply (panel C) impacts the difference between the average expectation of the
liquidation value and the average price when there is an incoming release of exogenous information and
mean-reversion of net supply, and the underlying signal is positive (the negative case is the symmetric).
In panel A Σs˜,20 ∈ [0, 10], Σs = 0.5 and ρ = 0.9. In panel B Σs ∈ [0, 10], Σs˜,20 = 0.2 and ρ = 0.9. In
panel C ρ ∈ [0.82, 1], Σs = 0.25 and Σs˜,20 = 0.2. The remaining parametrization is the same in all
panels: T = 41, n = 1, σ2v = 0.25, Σs˜,1 = 1, Σs˜i,t = 10
10 ∀t \ {1, 20}, σ2θ = 0.1, α = 2. In all panels,
the white line corresponds to the intersection of the surface plot with the plane defined by the average
price equal to the average expectation of the liquidation value. Positive (negative) values mean that
prices are further away (closer) to fundamentals than expectations.
and if there is no mean-reversion of net supply, the average price differs considerably
from the average expectation, specially in the dates immediately preceding the release
of new information. Bringing these two effects together, it should not be a surprise that
the latter dominates. Thus, the average price is closer to the fundamental value than
the average expectation is or, in other words, prices under-rely on public information.
This is the case specially as we move closer to the date where the new information is
released, when the second effect is stronger, and away from the date where the initial
information was released, where the first effect is stronger. When mean-reversion of
net supply is fast and residual uncertainty is low and/or the information to be released
is inaccurate, the opposite holds. But if the strength of the two effects that push the
average price away from the average expectation of the liquidation value are balanced
enough, we obtain under-reliance on public information in the dates closer to the release
of new information, and over-reliance on public information in the dates closer to the
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release of the initial information. This is shown in panel C of figure 1.
Figure 6 shows how changing each of the three relevant parameters, precision of
incoming information (Σs˜,20), level of residual uncertainty (Σs) and speed of mean-
reversion of net supply (ρ), can tilt the balance toward under-reliance or over-reliance
on public information.
5 Discrepancy between Average Prices and Expecta-
tions: The Case of Multiple Underlying Signals
In contrast to the previous section this section, here I consider that different releases
of exogenous information are based on different underlying signals. Provided that the
two underlying signals are positively correlated, the qualitative results of Section 4.3
remain unchanged, as we can see from panel A of figure 7.
Note that the two underlying signals being perfectly positively correlated is equiv-
alent to the underlying signal being the same. As the correlation between the two
underlying signals weakens, the incoming information resolves increasingly more uncer-
tainty. This implies that, even though demands will still become more homogeneous
after the release of the new information, demands will converge less as that correlation
weakens. In fact, when the two signals are uncorrelated, demands are not expected
to change in response to the new information, exactly as in the case where there is
no residual uncertainty. In that case, investors behave as in the static model and do
not engage in short-term trading. As we discussed in Section 4.3, the expectation of
more homogeneous demands generates short-term trading opportunities, which make
prices closer to fundamentals than expectations. Therefore, as the positive correlation
weakens, that difference between the average price and the average expectation shrinks.
As we move from uncorrelated signals, where the balance between the convergence
of beliefs and the increasing trading aggressiveness that keeps demands unchanged is
struck, to negatively correlated signals, demands become more heterogeneous after the
release of information. Now the new information resolves so much uncertainty that
the increase in trading aggressiveness dominates the convergence of beliefs. This case
is basically the opposite of what we analyzed in Section 4.3, and we obtain that the
average price is farther away from the fundamental value than the average expectation
is, as we can see from panel B of figure 7. But there is a nuance. When the two signals
are negatively correlated the average price starts closer to the fundamental value that
the average expectation if the date of release of new information is distant enough,
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Figure 7: The correlation between underlying signals and the discrepancy between the
average price and the average expectation of the liquidation value. This figures shows
how the difference between the average expectation of the liquidation value and the average price
changes with the correlation between the signal underlying the past release of information (s1) and
the signal underlying the incoming release of information (s2), when there is no mean-reversion of
net supply. In panel A the correlation ranges from 0 to 1, and in panel B from 0 to -1. In both
panels the parametrization is as follows: T = 41, n = 2, ρ = 1, σ2v = 0.25, Σs =
[
0.25 σs1,s2
σs1,s2 0.25
]
,
Σs˜,1 =
[
1 0
0 110
]
, Σs˜,20 =
[
110 0
0 0.2
]
, Σs˜,t =
[
110 0
0 110
]
∀t \ {1, 20}, σ2θ = 0.1, α = 2, s1 = 1,
s2 = 1. The white line corresponds to the intersection of the surface plot with the plane defined by
the average price equal to the average expectation of the liquidation value. Positive (negative) values
mean that prices are further away (closer) to fundamentals than expectations.
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reversing later on. This result stems from a different correlation structure between
expected price changes and the consequent impact on hedging demands.
In any case, the link between over-(under-)reliance on public information and prices
being closer (further away) from fundamentals than expectations is preserved. When
correlation is negative prices start by under-relying on public information and then
after some point over-rely on public information
Now I switch the attention to how the existence of multiple underlying signals change
the results of Section 4.2. As we saw in Section 4.2, when there is mean-reversion of
net supply, prices under-rely on public information after the last release of exogenous
information, and therefore prices are further away from fundamentals than expectations
(see panel A and C of figure 1). However, when there are multiple underlying signals,
this is no longer true. Even though prices under-rely on public information after the
last information release, they may be either closer of further away from fundamentals
than expectations. It all depends on the value of the underlying signals.
Before I proceed, I need to provide the definition of fundamental when there is more
than one underlying signal. The date t fundamental value is now the expectation of
the liquidation obtained from the direct observation of all underlying signals for which
exogenous information was already released by date t. This means that the fundamental
value changes whenever exogenous information for a new underlying signal is released
for the first time.
From now on, let us focus on the case of two distinct underlying signals. Generalizing
from lemma 6, we have that, after the release of the second and last exogenous informa-
tion, the fundamental value, average price and average expectation of the liquidation
value are given by
FVt = Kˆs
= a1s1 + a2s2
Eθ (Pt) = Kˆs+
(
Kˆ − pˆt
)
{Eθ [E (s|F
c
t )]− s}
= FVt + b1,t {Eθ [E (s1|F
c
t )]− s1}+ b2,t {Eθ [E (s2|F
c
t )]− s2}
Eθ,i
[
E
(
v|F it
)]
= Kˆs+ Kˆ
(
I2 − Γˆt
)
{Eθ [E (s|F
c
t )]− s}
= FVt + c1,t {Eθ [E (s1|F
c
t )]− s1}+ c2,t {Eθ [E (s2|F
c
t )]− s2}
for some constants a1, a2, b1,t, b2,t, c1,t and c2,t, and where I2 is a 2-dimensional identity
matrix. All three variables are a positive function of s2. Generically, these functions
have different slopes, because each variable puts different weights on prior information
and underlying signals. Therefore, keeping s1 fixed, if we plot these three variables as
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a function of s2, we find that they will eventually cross with each other at some point.
But, for prices to be further away from fundamentals than expectations in all scenarios,
the three variables have to cross at the same point. This happens if and only if there
is a s2 that solves the following system of equationsb1,t {Eθ [E (s1|F ct )]− s1}+ b2,t {Eθ [E (s2|F ct )]− s2} = 0c1,t {Eθ [E (s1|F ct )]− s1}+ c2,t {Eθ [E (s2|F ct )]− s2} = 0 ,
that is, we need b1,t
b2,t
= c1,t
c2,t
or Eθ [E (s1|F
c
t )]− s1 = 0 . However, generically the former
does not hold, even though b1,t > c1,t and b2,t > c2,t (over-reliance on public informa-
tion), and so the system of equations is solved only when both signals coincide with
the prior belief on the liquidation value.9 Therefore, if the first underlying signal does
not coincide with its unconditional mean, then there are some values of the second
underlying signal that bring the average price closer to the fundamental value than the
average expectation. In other words over-reliance on public information is no longer a
synonym of prices being further away from fundamentals than expectations.
Figure 8 illustrates the situation. In panel A the fundamental value is more sensitive
to s2 than the average expectation, and in turn the latter is more sensitive to s2 than
the average price. In this case there is a bounded region of s2 values for which prices are
closer to fundamentals than expectations. In contrast, in panel B the average expec-
tation is more sensitive to s2 than the average price and the fundamental value. Now
there is an unbounded region of s2 values for which prices are closer to fundamentals
than expectations.
6 Other Implications
The model developed in this paper delivers two other implications worth noting. The
first is the apparent leakage of inside information in the periods preceding the release
of exogenous information, which we can see from panels B and C of figure 1. Prices
appear to be move in anticipation and direction of the new information release. How-
ever, we know that in this model prices move in anticipation to the new information,
but in the direction of previous information. Investors trade in anticipation to the
impact of new information, and in doing so use their information more aggressively,
which impounds more of the existing information into prices. Moreover, this is only
9Since posterior beliefs of the underlying signal are biased toward the prior belief, the only way to
have Eθ [E (s1|F
c
t )]− s1 = 0 is for s1 = E (s1) = 0.
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Figure 8: Distance of average expectation of the liquidation value and average price to
the fundamental value, as a function of the second underlying signal. This plot shows the
distance of the average expectation of the liquidation value and of the average price to the fundamental
value as a function of the second underlying signal (s2). These distances are computed at the date the
information based on that underlying signal is released. The fundamental value, average expectation
and average price are linear functions of s2, and so cross at most once. In panel A, the average
expectation and average price cross at the rightmost intersection of the difference lines, whereas in
panel B they cross at the leftmost intersection. In panel A Σs˜,2 =
[
110 0
0 0.4
]
, and in panel B
Σs˜,2 =
[
110 0
0 0.3
]
. The rest of the parametrization is identical in both panels: T = 4, n = 2, ρ = 0,
σ2v = 0.25, Σs =
[
0.25 0
0 0.25
]
, Σs˜,1 =
[
1 0
0 110
]
, Σs˜,3 =
[
110 0
0 110
]
, σ2θ = 0.1, α = 2, s1 = 1.
the case when investors have private information about an underlying signal that is
positively correlated with that of the incoming information. Therefore, prices can and
will sometimes move in the opposite direction of the new information. However, as
long as the underlying signal of new and old information are positively correlated, good
news tend to be folowed by good news and bad news by bad news. Thus, most of the
time the price movement in anticipation to the release of new information is in the right
direction, making it look like leakage of inside information.
A second implication is that prices tend to be more informative about the funda-
mental value when the price volatility is high. Using a model similar to the one in this
paper, He and Wang (1995) show that price volatility increases in the periods leading to
the release of exogenous information, public or private, when there is already private in-
formation based on the same underlying signal (more generally, the same pattern holds
for correlated underlying signals). This is caused by investors trading more aggressively
on their private information in anticipation to the effects of the release of additional
information. As we saw, this impounds more of investors’ information into prices, mak-
ing prices better predictors of fundalmentals than average expectations. This result
supports the common view of a more volatility market as one where more information
is gathered (e.g. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)); and it is in contrast with the results
34
of Cespa (2002), who finds the opposite relation when the economy is populated by
short-term investors.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I show how the existence of short-term trading causes a divergence between
the average price and the average expectation of the fundamental value. When investors
engage in short-term trading, they care about intermediate prices. This embeds higher-
order expectations into prices which cause a discrepancy between prices and first-order
expectations. In other words, short-term trading diverts investors’ attentions from the
long run, allowing a discrepancy between the average price and the average expectation
to persist.
Short-term trading arises when investors receive private information and either (i)
net supply mean reverts or (ii) the pending release of additional information based on
the same underlying signal is combined with residual uncertainty. Mean-reversion of
net supply creates the opportunity to profit from liquidity traders as they predictably
exit the market. And the released of additional information creates the opportunity to
trade in anticipation to its price impact.
However, (i) and (ii) cause the average price to diverge from the average expectation
of the liquidation value in different directions. Mean-reversion of net supply, which
produces endogenous information, tends to bring expectations closer to fundamentals
than prices after the release of private exogenous information. By the contrary, residual
uncertainty and an incoming release of exogenous information tends to make prices
closer to fundamentals than expectations before the new information is released.
This paper extends Cespa and Vives (2012) results in two dimensions: (i) additional
exogenous information is crucial for prices to be closer to fundamentals than average
expectations; (ii) prices can be closer and further away from fundamentals than average
expectations at different times in the same economy.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 is derived from theorems 2, 4 and 5 of Barbosa (2011). Kˆ is obtained from lemma 9 of
Barbosa (2011), and Γˆ is obtained from equation (42) of Barbosa (2011).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Theorem 3 of Barbosa (2011) establishes that
∆Pt+1 = Ct+1ψt +Dt+1ε∆,t+1 (11)
ψt+1 = Ft+1ψt +Gt+1ε∆,t+1 (12)
From equation (11) we know that E
(
∆Pt+1| F
i
t
)
= Ct+1ψt. Recursive substitution of equation (12)
into (11) implies that E
(
∆Pt+τ | F
i
t
)
= Ct+τ
∏τ−1
j=1 Ft+τ−jψt. Thus, to prove equation (7) it suffices
to show that Qt in equation (6) is a linear function of Ct+τ
∏τ−1
j=1 Ft+τ−j for τ = 1, ..., T − t.
We can rewrite equations (34) and (36) of Barbosa (2011) as
Qt = ζ
Q
1,tCt+1 + ζ
Q
2,tHt+1Ft+1 (13)
Ht = ζ
H
1,tQt + ζ
H
2,tHt+1Ft+1 (14)
where
ζ
Q
1,t
(1×1)
≡
(
Dt+1Ξt+1D
′
t+1
)
−1
(15)
ζ
Q
2,t
(1×2n+2)
≡ −
(
Dt+1Ξt+1D
′
t+1
)
−1
Dt+1Ξt+1G
′
t+1 (16)
ζH1,t
(2n+2×1)
≡ Q′tDt+1Ξt+1D
′
t+1 (17)
ζH2,t
(2n+2×2n+2)
≡ F ′t+1 − F
′
t+1Ht+1Gt+1Ξt+1G
′
t+1. (18)
Starting at t = T − 1, we have QT−1 = ζ
Q
1,T−1CT and HT−1 = ζ
H
1,T−1ζ
Q
1,T−1CT . Using backward
substitution, it is easy to verify that both Qt and Ht are linear functions of Ct+τ
∏τ−1
j=1 Ft+τ−j for
τ = 1, ..., T − t,
Qt =
T−t∑
τ=1
χQτ,tCt+τ τ−1∏
j=1
Ft+τ−j

Ht =
T−t∑
τ=1
χHτ,tCt+τ τ−1∏
j=1
Ft+τ−j

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where
χ
Q
1,t
(1×1)
≡ ζQ1,t (19)
χ
Q
τ,t
(1×1)
≡ ζQ2,tχ
H
τ−1,t+1, τ = 2, ..., T − t (20)
χH1,t
(2n+2×1)
≡ ζH1,tχ
Q
1,t
χHτ,t
(2n+2×1)
≡ ζH1,tχ
Q
τ,t + ζ
H
2,tχ
H
τ−1,t+1, τ = 2, ..., T − t.
Finally, note that χQ1,t =
(
Dt+1Ξt+1D
′
t+1
)
−1
> 0, since Ξt+1 is a positive definite matrix (see
Barbosa, 2011). This concludes the proof of equation (7).
With equation (7) as the starting point, it is straightforward to rewrite the demand function as
equation (8). Simply rearrange the expected prices to obtain the expected price change from date t
to date τ ∈ {t+ 1, t+ 2, ..., T} instead of price changes from date τ − 1 to τ , τ ∈ {t+ 1, t+ 2, ..., T}.
Proceeding in this way
Xit =
1
α
T−t∑
τ=1
χ
Q
τ,tE
[
∆Pt+τ |F
i
t
]
=
1
α
T−t−1∑
τ=1
χ
Q
τ,tE
[
∆Pt+τ |F
i
t
]
+
1
α
χ
Q
T−t,tE
[
PT − PT−1|F
i
t
]
=
1
α
T−t−1∑
τ=1
χ
Q
τ,tE
[
∆Pt+τ |F
i
t
]
+
1
α
χ
Q
T−t,tE
[
Pt − PT−1|F
i
t
]
+
1
α
χ
Q
T−t,tE
[
PT − Pt|F
i
t
]
=
1
α
T−t−2∑
τ=1
χ
Q
τ,tE
[
∆Pt+τ |F
i
t
]
+
1
α
χ
Q
T−t−1,tE
[
PT−1 − PT−2|F
i
t
]
+
1
α
χ
Q
T−t,tE
[
Pt − PT−1|F
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t
]
+
1
α
χ
Q
T−t,tE
[
PT − Pt|F
i
t
]
=
1
α
T−t−2∑
τ=1
χ
Q
τ,tE
[
∆Pt+τ |F
i
t
]
+
1
α
χ
Q
T−t−1,tE
[
Pt − PT−2|F
i
t
]
+
1
α
(
χ
Q
T−t−1,t − χ
Q
T−t,t
)
E
[
PT−1 − Pt|F
i
t
]
+
1
α
χ
Q
T−t,tE
[
PT − Pt|F
i
t
]
=
1
α
T−t∑
τ=1
ξτ,tE
[
Pt+τ − Pt|F
i
t
]
where
ξτ,t = χ
Q
τ,t − χ
Q
τ+1,t ∀τ ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − t− 1} , (21)
ξT−t,t = χ
Q
T−t,t. (22)
To show that demand can be written as in equation (9) and derive the expressions for φQτ,t, I follow
the same steps used above to derived the expressions for χQτ,t. Starting at t = T − 1, equations (13)
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and (14) give us QT−1 = ζ
Q
1,T−1CT and HT−1 = ζ
H
1,T−1QT−1. And at t = T − 2 we have
QT−2 = ζ
Q
1,T−2CT−1 + ζ
Q
2,T−2ζ
H
1,T−1QT−1FT−1
= φQ1,T−2CT−1 + φ2,T−2QT−1FT−1
HT−2 = ζ
H
1,T−2QT−2 + ζ
H
2,T−2ζ
H
1,T−1QT−1FT−1
= φH1,T−2QT−2 + φ
H
2,T−2QT−1FT−1.
Using backward substitution, it is easy to verify that
Qt = φ
Q
1,tCt+1 +
T−t∑
τ=2
φ
Q
τ,tQt+τ−1
τ−1∏
j=1
Ft+τ−j (23)
Ht =
T−t∑
τ=1
φHτ,tQt+τ−1
τ−1∏
j=1
Ft+τ−j
with
φ
Q
1,t = ζ
Q
1,t = χ
Q
1,t
φ
Q
τ,t = ζ
Q
2,tφ
H
τ−1,t+1
φH1,t = ζ
H
1,t
φHτ,t = ζ
H
2,tφ
H
τ−1,t+1.
Finally, notice that, from equation (11) we have E
[
∆Pt+1|F
i
t
]
= Ct+1ψt. Moreover, taking the
expectation of the demand function (6), using the law of iterated expectations and repeated substitution
of equation (12) we obtain E
[
Xit+τ |F
i
t
]
= Qt+τ
(∏τ
j=1 Ft+τ+1−j
)
ψt. Therefore, from equation (23)
we can write the demand function as equation (9).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 6
Generically, the fundamental value is defined as FVt = E (v|s
o), where so is the vector of underlying
signals already observed by date t. We can use equation (28) of Barbosa (2011) to compute the
expectation and obtain FVt = Kˆs
o. In Appendix A.2 Barbosa (2011) shows how the vector Kˆ can be
computed. When there is a signal underlying signal s and exogenous information about it is released
at date 1, it follows that FVt = Kˆs.
The expression for the average price is obtained by averaging the price function (5) over the net
supply, and using equation (14) of Barbosa (2011) to substitute for pt = Kˆ − pˆt.
Finally, the average expectation of the liquidation value is determined as
Eθ,i
[
E
(
v|F it
)]
= Eθ,i
{
E
[
E (v|s) |F it
]}
= KˆEθ,i
[
E
(
s|F it
)]
= KˆEθ
[
Γˆts+
(
1− Γˆt
)
E (s| Fct )
]
=
(
1− Γˆt
)
Eθ [E (s| F
c
t )] + KˆΓˆts,
where the second equality follows from equation (28) of Barbosa (2011), and the third equality follows
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from equation (41) of Barbosa (2011). The expression for Γˆt is given by equation (42) of Barbosa
(2011).
Averaging the expression for E (s| Fct ), equation (8) of Barbosa (2011), over the net supply, we
can determine that E (s| Fct ) is a convex combination of the prior belief on v (which is zero) and s.
This is obvious since investors form their beliefs by averaging over the signals they observe and their
prior belief and, when averaging over net supply, all public signals for s are unbiased. In turn, we
have that
{
Kˆ, Γˆt, pt, pˆt
}
∈ (0, 1)
4
. This is straightforward to prove for Kˆ and Γˆt. But not for pt
and pˆt, since there is no closed form solution for the price function parameters when there is residual
uncertainty. However, numerical results strongly suggest this is the case. With
{
Kˆ, Γˆt, pt, pˆt
}
∈ (0, 1)
4
it then follows that both the fundamental value, the average price and the average expectation of the
liquidation value are convex combinations of the prior on v and s. Since E (s|Fct ) gives some weight to
the prior belief on v, the average price and the average expectation of the liquidation value are biased
toward the prior belief on v. This proves point (i).
Obviously, the less weight is put on the public information E (s|Fct ), the smaller the bias toward
the prior belief. Therefore, the average price is closer to the fundamental value than the average
expectation of the liquidation value is whenever pˆt < Kˆ
(
1− Γˆt
)
, which proves point (ii).
A.4 Proof that ξ1,1 and ξ2,1 are Strictly Positive in a 3-Period
Model without Residual Uncertainty
Equations (21) and (22) define the demand function coefficients ξ1,1 and ξ2,1 as a function of χ
Q
1,1 and
χ
Q
2,1, which in turn are defined by equations (19) and (20). We can then write
ξ1,1 = χ
Q
1,1 − χ
Q
2,1 = χ
Q
1,1 (1 +D2Ξ2G
′
2Q
′
2)
ξ2,1 = χ
Q
2,1 = −χ
Q
1,1D2Ξ2G
′
2Q
′
2.
Lemma 4 gives us that χQ1,1 > 0. Therefore, ξ1,1 and ξ2,1 are strictly positive if and only if −1 ≤
D2Ξ2G
′
2Q
′
2 ≤ 0.
Using the results obtained in Appendix C of Barbosa (2011), where I solve a 3-period and no
residual uncertainty version of the model, after long and tedious algebra we can determine that
D2Ξ2G
′
2Q
′
2 = −
V i2
(
1
βσ2
i,1
+ 1−βρ
α2β2σ4
i,1
σ2
θ
)(
α2βσ2i,1σ
2
θ +
V i1 (1−ρ)(1−βρ)
σ2
i,1
)
1 + V i2
(
V i1 (1−ρ)
2
σ4
i,1
+ 1−β
βσ2
i,1
+ α2σ2θ
) < 0
where, following the notation of Appendix C of Barbosa (2011), V it ≡ V ar
(
v|F it
)
and Σs˜,2 ≡ σ
2
i,2 ≡
β
1−βσ
2
i,1, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. To determine that D2Ξ2G
′
2Q
′
2 > −1, let us write
D2Ξ2G
′
2Q
′
2 = −
a
1 + b
.
Then,
D2Ξ2G
′
2Q
′
2 > −1⇔ b− a > −1.
After some algebra and simplification, using the definitions of V it from Barbosa (2011), we determine
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the difference b− a as
b− a = − (1− ρ)
V i1
σ2i,1
.
Since 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and, by definition, V i1 ≤ σ
2
i,1, it follows that b − a ≥ −1. This difference is strictly
positive whenever there is mean-reversion of net supply (ρ < 1) and/or the prior is informative (i.e.
σ2v > 0⇒ V
i
1 < σ
2
i,1). The latter is always assumed, and so b− a > 1, which proves that ξ1,1 and ξ2,1
are strictly positive.
B Closed-Form Solution of the Model without Resid-
ual Uncertainty and without Mean-Reversion of
Net Supply
Here I will solve a special case of the model, when there is no residual uncertainty nor mean-reversion of
net supply, in closed form. This is similar to what was done in Appendix C of Barbosa (2011), where I
solve a 3-period model without residual uncertainty in closed form. I will introduce here the same modi-
fications were done in Barbosa (2011): I redefine ξt ≡ s+
pθ,t
pt
θt, ε∆,t ≡
[
s− E
(
s|F it
)
εit+1 εθ,t+1
]
′
and ψt ≡
[
1 E
(
s|F it
)
− E (s|Fct ) E
(
θt|F
i
t
) ]′
. These modifications imply changes in Ct+1, Ft+1,
Gt+1, Qt+1, Ht+1 that will be detailed below.
I start by defining
wt ≡
1∑t
k=1
1
σ2
i,k
, zt ≡
1∑t
k=1
1
σ4
i,k
(24)
Then, from corollary 2 of He and Wang (1995), we have
pθ,t
pt
= −αwt. (25)
It is the knowledge of this ratio that allows us to solve for pt and pθ,t recursively from date T − 1.
Conditional beliefs, and matricesKt andK
c
t are obtained by applying Lemma 9 (Gaussian filtering)
of Barbosa (2011), with xt, yt, At, Bt, Σx,t, Σy,t, E [x0|F0] and V ar [x0|F0] =
[
σ2v 0
0 0
]
exactly
as defined in Appendix C of Barbosa (2011), but fixing ρ = 1 in At. Using equation (25), after
simplification we obtain
V it ≡ V ar
(
v|F it
)
=
1
1
σ2v
+ 1
wt
+ 1
α2σ2
θ
zt
, V ct ≡ V ar (v|F
c
t ) =
1
1
σ2v
+ 1
α2σ2
θ
zt
(26)
and
Kt =
 V itα2σ2θσ2i,twt V itσ2i,t
1
αwt
(
V it
α2σ2
θ
σ2
i,t
wt
− 1
)
V it
ασ2
i,t
wt
 , Kct =
 V itα2σ2θσ2i,twt
1
αwt
(
V it
α2σ2
θ
σ2
i,t
wt
− 1
)  . (27)
From (26) and (24) we obtain the following 4 relations between conditional variances that will be
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extensively used throughout to simplify expressions:
1
V it
−
1
V ct
=
1
wt
,
1
V it
−
1
V it−1
=
1
σ2i,t
+
1
α2σ2θσ
4
i,t
,
1
V ct
−
1
V ct−1
=
1
α2σ2θσ
4
i,t
. (28)
Knowing Kt and K
c
t we can obtain the expressions for Ct, Dt, Ft, Gt and Σ∆,t as defined in
Appendix A.2 of Barbosa (2011), with the necessary adaptations that the redefinition of ξt and ψt
require.10. After simplification we obtain, for t ≤ T − 1
Ct =
[
0 1− (1− pt)
V ct
V c
t−1
pθ,t
]
−
[
0 pt−1 pθ,t−1
]
= Cˆt −
[
0 pt−1 pθ,t−1
]
Dt =
[
ptwt
σ2i,t
+ (1− pt)
(
1−
V ct
V ct−1
)][
1 0 −ασ2i,t
]
Ft =

1 0 0
0
V ct
V c
t−1
0
0 0 1

Gt =

0 0 0
V ct
V c
t−1
−
V it
V i
t−1
V it
σ2
i,t
V ct −V
i
t
ασ2
θ
σ2
i,t
− 1
αV ct
(
V ct
V c
t−1
−
V it
V i
t−1
)
V it
αwtσ
2
i,t
1−
V it
α2σ2
θ
σ2
i,t
wt

Σ∆,t =
 V
i
t−1 0 0
0 σ2i,t 0
0 0 σ2θ
 .
From equation (42) of Barbosa (2011), we obtain
Γˆt =
V it
wt
which we can then use to obtain Qt from the market clearing condition (13) of theorem 5 of Barbosa
(2011),11
Qt =
[
0 1
V ct
α
]
. (29)
Using the recursive definition of Qt, equation (34) of Barbosa (2011), and the above market clearing
condition, we can determine pt and pθ,t recursively starting from T − 1 as
[
pt−1 pθ,t−1
]
= −DtΞtD
′
t
[
1
V c
t−1
α
]
+
(
Cˆt −DtΞtG
′
tHtFt
) 0 01 0
0 1
 . (30)
Starting with the T − 1 price coefficients, by definition we have HT = 0(3,3). Therefore, from
10The modification in the state vector ψt implies that: the third column of Ct, the third row of Gt,
the third column and row of Ft disappear; the second row of Ft and Gtbecome the difference between
the old second and third rows. The modification in ε∆,t implies that: the first column of Dt and Gt
and the first column and row of Σ∆,t disappear. And the modification of ξt implies that: k
c
s,ξ,t+1 and
kcθ,ξ,t+1 are divided by pt wherever they show up in Ct, Dt, Ft and Gt.
11The modification in ψt implies that the third column disappears.
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equation (33) of Barbosa (2011) we obtain ΞT = Σ∆,T . Therefore,
[
pT−1 pθ,T−1
]
= −DTΣ∆,TD
′
T
[
1
V c
T−1
α
]
+ CˆT
 0 01 0
0 1
 = [ V iT−1
wT−1
−αV iT−1
]
.
To obtain the T−2 price coefficients we need first to determineHT−1 using equation (36) of Barbosa
(2011). Once we getHT−1 we can then compute ΞT−1,DT−1ΞT−1D
′
T−1 andDT−1ΞT−1G
′
T−1HT−1FT−1,
and finally obtain pT−2 and pθ,T−2. Starting with HT−1, it can be written as
HT−1 = V
i
T−1

0
1
V c
T−1
α
[ 0 1V cT−1 α ] .
After simplification, the matrix G′T−1HT−1GT−1, necessary to compute ΞT−1, can be written as
G′T−1HT−1GT−1 =

0
1
σ2
i,T−1
α
[ 0 1σ2i,T−1 α ]
and ΞT−1 is then given by
ΞT−1 = Σ∆,T−1 −
V iT−1
1 + V iT−1
(
1
σ2
i,T−1
+ α2σ2θ
)
 01
ασ2θ
[ 0 1 ασ2θ ] .
We can now compute the DT−1ΞT−1D
′
T−1, obtaining
DT−1ΞT−1D
′
T−1 =
V iT−2
(
1
V i
T−1
− 1
V i
T−2
)2
1
V i
T−1
(
1
V c
T−1
+ 1
V c
T−2
)
+ 1
σ2
i,T−1
(
1
V i
T−1
− 1
V i
T−2
) .
I turn, G′T−1HT−1FT−1 can be written as
G′T−1HT−1FT−1 = V
i
T−1

0
1
σ2
i,T−1
α
[ 0 1V cT−2 α ]
from which we obtain
DT−1ΞT−1G
′
T−1HT−1FT−1 = −V
i
T−1
1
σ2
i,T−1
(
1
V i
T−1
− 1
V i
T−2
)
1
V i
T−1
(
1
V c
T−1
+ 1
V c
T−2
)
+ 1
σ2
i,T−1
(
1
V i
T−1
− 1
V i
T−2
) .
Bringing everything together, from equation (30) we obtain, after a great deal of simplification that[
pT−2 pθ,T−2
]
=
[
V iT−2
wT−2
−αV iT−2
]
.
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Since Cˆt, Dt, Ft, Gt and Σ∆,t have the same form at all dates t ≤ T − 1, if the same is true for
Ht, which would imply that Ξt also retains the same form, then we would obtain[
pt pθ,t
]
=
[
V it
wt
−αV it
]
. (31)
So the next and final step is to derive HT−2 and verify that it has the same form of HT−1, which
would imply that Ht have the same form at all dates t ≤ T − 1. Once again, using equation (36) of
Barbosa (2011), we obtain
HT−2 = V
i
T−2

0
1
V c
T−2
α
[ 0 1V cT−2 α ]+

ln
∣∣∣Σ∆,T−1ΞT−1 ∣∣∣ 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
 .
For the purpose of computing the price coefficients the second term can be ignored, since the first row
of Gt is full of zeros. This means that dropping the second term has no impact on G
′
tHtGt and thus
on Ξt; and it also has no impact on DtΞtG
′
tHtFt. Therefore, we can confirm that the price function
coefficients are given by equation (29) for all t.
Next, I use the solution obtained above to compute the expected price change, showing that on
average the AI does not expect a price change at any future dates, and to compute the demand
function, showing that it is the same that arises in a static model or, equivalently, in the base-case
model where there is no additional release of exogenous information nor mean-reversion of net supply.
B.1 Expected Price Change
Expected price changes can be computed from the price change and state vector processes, equations
(9) and (10) of theorem 3 of Barbosa (2011), as
E
(
∆Pt+τ |F
i
t
)
= E
(
Ct+τψt+τ−1 +Dt+τε∆,t+τ |F
i
t
)
= Ct+τE
(
ψt+τ−1|F
i
t
)
= Ct+τE
(
Ft+τ−1ψt+τ−2 +Gt+τ−1ε∆,t+τ−1|F
i
t
)
= Ct+τFt+τ−1E
(
ψt+τ−2|F
i
t
)
= Ct+τ
τ−1∏
j=1
Ft+τ−jψt
The product is easily to determined as
τ−1∏
j=1
Ft+τ−j =
 1 0 00 V ct+τ−1V ct 0
0 0 1
 .
The expression for Ct can be simplified by substituting for the pt and pθ,t using equation (29), obtaining
Ct =
(
V it−1 − V
i
t
) [
0 1
V c
t−1
α
]
.
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It the follows that
E
(
∆Pt+τ |F
i
t
)
=
(
V it+τ−1 − V
i
t+τ
) [
0 1
V ct
α
]
ψt
=
(
V it+τ−1 − V
i
t+τ
)
Qtψt
= α
(
V it+τ−1 − V
i
t+τ
)
Xit
where the second equality follows from equation (29) and the last equality from equation (6). We can
see that the expected price change between dates t + τ − 1 and t + τ is the product of the expected
reduction in uncertainty from t + τ − 1 to t + τ with the current demand and the coefficient of risk-
aversion. Therefore, prices are expected to change only in the periods where exogenous information is
released.
Averaging over net supply and investors, it follows that
Eθ,i
[
E
(
∆Pt+τ |F
i
t
)]
= α
(
V it+τ−1 − V
i
t+τ
)
Eθ,i
(
Xit
)
= 0
which means that, on average, the AI does not expect a price change at any future date, regardless of
whether exogenous information is released or not.
B.2 Demand Function
The demand is given by equation (6). Simplification yields
Xit =
1
α
Qtψt
=
1
α
[
0 1
V ct
α
] [
1 E
(
s|F it
)
− E (s|Fct ) E
(
θt|F
i
t
) ]′
=
E
(
s|F it
)
− E (s|Fct )
αV ct
+ E
(
θt|F
i
t
)
=
E
(
s|F it
)
− E (s|Fct )
αV it
V it
V ct
+ E
(
θt|F
i
t
)
=
E
(
s|F it
)
− ptE
(
s|F it
)
− (1− pt)E (s|F
c
t )− pθ,tE
(
θt|F
i
t
)
αV it
=
E
(
s|F it
)
− [pts+ (1− pt)E (s|F
c
t )− pθ,tθt]
αV it
=
E
(
s|F it
)
− Pt
αV it
,
which corresponds to the demand function in a static 2-period model (i.e. one trading date and one
liquidation date). The fifth equality follows from equation (31) and (28); the sixth follows from the
fact that ξt = s+
pθ,t
pt
θt is observationally equivalent to the price, and so E
(
ξt|F
i
t
)
= ξt; and the last
equality follows from equation (5) and the fact that Kˆ = 1 since v = s and, from equation (28) of
Barbosa (2011), E [v|s] = Kˆs.
45
C Discussion on Correlation of Price Changes
Here I discuss how mean-reversion of net supply and risk reduction affect the correlation between price
changes.
To have a base case on which to build the intuition, I start by considering the case where there
is no mean-reversion of net supply nor risk reduction through endogenous or exogenous release of
information. This corresponds to the base case discussed in Section 4.1. The absence of risk reduction
implies that pθ,t = pθ. Therefore, a supply shock at date t has the same impact on Pt as it has (on
average) on all subsequent prices except PT . This exception follows from the fact that the asset is
liquidated at date T and so PT = v regardless of the net supply level. As a result, a negative shock
at t, which increases all prices from dates t until T − 1, implies that: ∆Pt increases; ∆Pt+τ = 0,
τ = {1, 2, ..., T − t− 1} remains unchanged; and ∆PT decreases. Thus, ∆Pt is uncorrelated with all
subsequent price changes, except ∆PT with which it is negatively correlated. In turn a supply shock
at date t− 1 has no impact on ∆Pt and all subsequent price changes, except ∆PT . This means that,
following a negative supply shock at date t− 1, ∆Pt is uncorrelated with all subsequent price changes,
including ∆PT .
Therefore, when there is no mean-reversion of net supply nor risk reduction, ∆Pt is uncorrelated
with all subsequent price changes, except ∆PT with which it is negatively correlated. In this case, we
have
χ
Q
τ,t = χ
Q
τ+1,t > 0 ∀τ ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − t− 1} .
The hedging demand will be only a function of the expected price change from date t + 1 to T , that
is
∑T−t
τ=2 E
[
∆Pt+τ |F
i
t
]
, and will have the same sign of the expected price change.
Next, consider the effect of mean-reversion in net supply (0 < ρ < 1). Now the impact of a
supply shock on future prices decreases as time passes. Therefore, a supply shock at date t makes
∆Pt negatively correlated with all subsequent price changes. In turn, a supply shock at date t − 1
makes ∆Pt positively correlated with all subsequent price changes. But overall, the impact of supply
shocks at date t dominates, and price changes are negatively correlated. This is the case because ∆Pt
increases only if the net supply level decreased from t− 1 to t which, on average, means that the net
supply at date t is negative. The expected mean-reversion of this negative net supply in the periods
that follow generates negative price differences, which in turn generates negative correlation between
∆Pt and all subsequent price changes. In this case we have
χ
Q
τ,t > χ
Q
τ+1,t > 0 ∀τ ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − t− 1} ,
that is, hedging demand has the same sign of expected future price changes, but less weight is given
to price changes more distant into the future.
Finally, consider the effect of risk reduction. Risk reduction can be achieved either through endoge-
nously produced information or through the release of exogenous information. If the asset becomes
less risky as time passes, then a supply shock at date t has a decreasing effect on all prices from date
t up to date T − 1. This means that, following a negative shock at date t, ∆Pt increases whereas
all subsequent price changes decrease, inducing negative correlation between ∆Pt and all subsequent
price changes. However, a negative supply shock at any date before date t will also decrease ∆Pt,
which contributes to positive correlation. Whether, overall, ∆Pt is positively or negatively correlated
with subsequent price changes will depend on how fast the risk decreases. For example, an increase
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in ∆Pt can be driven by: a decrease in the net supply from dates t− 1 to t, which on average means
that θt < 0; or by a decrease in risk reduction from date t− 1 to date t, which means that θt > 0. In
the first case subsequent risk reductions will decrease subsequent price changes and result in negative
correlation between ∆Pt and those price changes. Exactly the opposite occurs in the second case.
Obviously, risk reduction is more likely to be driving changes in ∆Pt if it is large. Therefore, unless
risk reduces sharply from t− 1 to t, ∆Pt is negatively correlated with all subsequent price changes.
As I mention in the main text, mean-reversion of net supply generates endogenous information.
Thus, if the risk reduction generated by endogenous information is very sharp, it may cause ∆Pt to
be positively correlated with future price changes, even though mean-reversion of net supply by itself
induces negative correlation. However, extensive numerical simulations suggests that this is never the
case. The amount of risk reduction originating from endogenous information is very gradual and spread
out through time. Therefore, even after accounting for endogenous information, mean-reversion of net
supply leads to
χ
Q
τ,t > χ
Q
τ+1,t > 0 ∀τ ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − t− 1} ,
and hedging demand has the same sign of future expected price changes.
When risk reduction originates from exogenous information, however, risk from date t− 1 to t can
decrease enough over one period for ∆Pt to become positively correlated with future price changes.
12
In that case we have
χ
Q
τ,t < 0 ∀τ ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − t− 1}
and hedging demand has the opposite sign of future expected price changes.
D Discussion of Assumption 5
The lack of a closed form solution for the general version of the model makes it impossible to prove
the validity of assumption 5. And even in the special case of no residual uncertainty, the complexity
of the solution makes this task infeasible for more than 3 periods.
I will start by considering a 2-period model (T = 3) with an exogenous return process (i.e., without
the learning component). This exercise is fruitful because it shows that assumption 5 does not hold for
all return processes, and indicates the conditions that would lead to the violation of this assumption.
As we will see, these conditions are unlikely to arise in the model considered in this paper. I support
this conjecture by proving that assumption 5 holds in a 3-period and no residual uncertainty version
of the model.
D.1 Exogenous Return Process
I will consider that the expected return follows the AR(1) process
∆Pt = µt + ρt (∆Pt−1 − µt−1) + σtεt, t = 1, 2
12For this we also need residual uncertainty.
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with εt ∼ N (0, 1). This process can be rewritten as equations (9) and (10) of theorem 5 of Barbosa
(2011) by defining
ψt =
[
1
∆Pt − µt
]
, ε∆,t = εt, Σ∆,t = 1,
Ct =
[
µt ρt
]
, Dt = σt, Ft =
[
1 0
0 ρt
]
, Gt =
[
0
σt
]
.
The objective is to determine the expressions for χQ1,1 and χ
Q
2,1, from equations (19) and (20),
and verify the conditions for which χQ1,1 − χ
Q
2,1 > 0, that is for which assumption 5 holds. To that
end, we need to determine Ξ2 and Q2, for which we use equations (34) and (30) of Barbosa (2011).
To determine Ξ2 and Q2 we need to work backward from date 3 and we need H2, which is given by
equation (36) of Barbosa (2011).
At the terminal date, date 3, we have
H3 =
[
0 0
0 0
]
⇒ Ξ3 = Σ∆,3 = 1.
We can then determine Q2 as
Q2 = (D3D
′
3)
−1
C3 =
1
σ23
[
µ3 ρ3
]
.
Next we obtain H2 as
H2 = Q
′
2D3D
′
3Q2 =
1
σ23
[
µ23 µ3ρ3
µ3ρ3 ρ
2
3
]
,
from which we can then finally obtain Ξ2 as
Ξ2 = (Σ∆,2 +G
′
2H2G2)
−1
=
σ23
σ23 + σ
2
2ρ
2
3
.
We can now derive the expressions for χQ1,1 and χ
Q
2,1:
χ
Q
1,1 = (D2Ξ2D
′
2)
−1
=
σ23 + σ
2
2ρ
2
3
σ22σ
2
3
=
V ar (∆P3|F1)
αV ar (∆P2|F1)V ar (∆P3|F2)
χ
Q
2,1 = − (D2Ξ2D
′
2)
−1
D2Ξ2G
′
2Q
′
2 = −
ρ3
σ23
= −
Cov (∆P2,∆P3|F1)
αV ar (∆P2|F1)V ar (∆P3|F2)
.
Assumption 5 holds if and only if
χ
Q
1,1 − χ
Q
2,1 > 0⇔ σ
2
3 + σ
2
2ρ3 (1 + ρ3) > 0⇔ V ar (∆P3|F1) + Cov (∆P2,∆P3|F1) > 0.
Fixing the variances, the left hand side is minimized when ρ3 = −
1
2 . In the worst case scenario,
assumption 5 holds if and only if σ23 >
σ22
4 . This means that for the assumption 5 to be false, we need
a very large reduction of uncertainty and a relatively large negative correlation between price changes.
However, as discussed in Appendix C, in the general model with learning, the more uncertainty is
resolved, the more prices tend to be positively correlated. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that such a
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large reduction in uncertainty can coexist with a large negative correlation in price changes.
D.2 Endogenous Return Process With No Residual Uncertainty
It is feasible to show that assumption 5 holds for the model with learning considered when there is no
residual uncertainty, and T = 3. In that case, we simply need to show that
χ
Q
1,1 − χ
Q
2,1 = χ
Q
1,1 (1 +D2Ξ2G
′
2Q
′
2) > 0
which was already accomplished in Appendix A.4. Therefore, assumption 5 holds in this simplified
version of the model.
I was able also to verify that the same holds true in the case of T = 4 with two announcements,
one at t = 1 and the other at t = 3 (the expressions are too long to report here, though). But the
expressions become intractable for models with more periods or announcement dates.
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